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Case
Study O6:
Transfusion Reaction
Coincidental with Failure to Disobey Physician Orders
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Last updated:
8 Dec. 2009
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NOTES
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LEARNING
OUTCOMES
Upon completion of this exercise, participants should be able to do the
following: - Discuss standards and best practices related to
monitoring patients before, during, and after transfusion.
- Discuss best practices for investigating a suspected transfusion
reaction.
- Explain the responsibilities of health professionals for
patient safety as it relates to their scope of practice and other health
providers.
- Discuss perceived loss of
professional autonomy as an obstacle to collaboration and open questioning
within health teams.
- Describe mechanisms that can allow members of different professions to
question inappropriate orders and decisions of other health providers in a
collaborative environment.
- Discuss education to assure that health providers have
the necessary skills to provide expected interdisciplinary checks for patient safety,
such as questioning physician orders.
Original CASE
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This case derives from an unpublished study
case created by Amélie Rivard, Nurse Clinician in charge of
Transfusion Safety, McGill University Health Center.
Amélie
and her colleague Anna Urbanek work as Nurse Clinicians in charge of
Transfusion Safety at MUHC. Amélie
Rivard retains copyright for the original case.
TraQ has copyright for this web-based
case, which has been fictionalized to enhance its educational
value. The described events and practices did not happen at MUHC. |
TOP
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Special thanks to the following
who kindly provided advice, information, and ideas
for the case. The discussion benefits from their valuable input (errors or misstatements are entirely those of the author):
-
Gwen
Clarke, MD FRCPC (Capital Health, University of Alberta, &
Canadian Blood Services, Edmonton, AB)
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Denise Evanovitch, MLT, Dipl. Adult Ed (Technical
Specialist, Education and Training, Hamilton Regional Laboratory
Medicine Program, Hamilton, ON)
-
Kate Gagliardi,
BA, ART (Regional Blood Coordinator, Ontario Regional Blood
Coordinating Network, Hamilton, ON)
- Ana Lima, RN, HP (ASCP) (Transfusion
Safety Nurse, Sunnybrook Health
Sciences Centre, Toronto, ON)
- Veronika Pulley, RN (Blood Conservation Program
Coordinator [ONTraC], Windsor Regional Hospital, Windsor, ON)
- Amélie Rivard, RN (Transfusion Safety Nurse,
McGill University Health Centre, Montreal, PQ)
case scenario
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The essentials of the case: (Hover
mouse over words to
expand
to a definition)
PRESENTATION
A 26 year old
single female living with her parents was admitted for a CSF leak from the nose, fever, lethargy, neck stiffness and pain. She
had multiple surgeries in the past and her health status was poorly
controlled. She was admitted to the ER on Jan. 9 for
brain surgery. A diagnosis of meningitis followed within a few
days.
On Jan. 12 a CT scan of the head showed a large amount of intracranial air in
the subarachnoid space and ventricular system. There was a moderate
hydrocephalus and the size of the ventricular system had progressed.
Between the Jan.12–13 a drain was inserted via a frontal burr hole, the tip of the drain located
in the third ventricule. On the following CT scan the volume of
intracranial air had slowly decreased and the size of ventricular system
was reduced. The morning of Jan. 19 the physician decided
to close the drain and the patient stabilized.
In the afternoon
of Jan. 19 patient hemoglobin was dropping quickly and
the physician decided to transfuse 2 units of packed red blood cells (PRBC).
Blood Test Results
(Reference Range)
-
Hemoglobin
79 g/L (120–160)
-
Hematocrit
0.270 L/L (0.370–0.470)
-
Platelets 503
x 109/L
(140–440 x 109/L)
Past Medical History
-
Retinoblastoma
(bilateral resection and radiotherapy)
-
Rhabodomyosarcoma
(chemotherapy in 2005)
-
Nasal and
sinus
surgery
-
Port-o-cath
insertion
(Port-o-cath)
Transfusion Service Laboratory
The patient had
been tested once before in another hospital as O Rh positive. A type
and screen was done, 2 units of packed red blood cells (PRBC) were crossmatched, and one was sent
to the patient's ward.
Transfusion -
PRBC #1
The first unit was
started at 10:55 am. Vital signs were recorded:
- Blood
pressure: 130/72
- Oxygen
saturation: 96%
- Temperature:
36.9oC
- Pulse: 109/min.
As the nurse was
unable to get an infusion rate faster than 1 drop/10sec., she flushed
the port-o-cath with 350 U of heparin. The
rate did not increase and she replaced the needle with no success.
Finding a new IV access was unlikely because patient had poor vein
access and would have required a new port-o-cath insertion or a central
venous access, not considered possible as the patient was already
unstable.
The nurse called
the attending physician to explain the situation and charted the
conversation as follows:
The nurse
followed the order and ran the transfusion over a little more than 8
hours. No further vital signs were taken.
Transfusion -
PRBC #2
The second unit
was started by the same nurse (who was working a 12-hour shift) at 19:15 h.
Vital signs were taken with no untoward results. No further vital signs
were taken until 20:30 h. when the patient started shaking and
stiffness was noted. The transfusion was stopped, the physician was contacted,
and the nurse
followed standard procedures detailed
in the facility's nursing manual.
Vital signs were
- Temperature:
40.9 oC (axillary
)
- Pulse: 220/min.
- Blood
pressure: 150/99
- Oxygen
saturation: 98% on rebreather
The patient
presented
decerebration
but no
clonus opisthotonos
, no bronchospasm, but
loss of consciousness. The patient was given Benadryl IV, bolus 250cc
and solumedrol IV push. The patient was then transferred to an intensive
care unit.
In the ICU,
patient was covered with cooling blanket and received Lopressor x 4
doses, Fentanyl push, Propofol, Dilantin, IVIg boluses, Tylenol. The
patient was finally intubated and put into artificial coma. Blood
culture was done and blood bag returned to blood bank for investigation.
FOLLOW-UP
Laboratory Services
Upon detecting the suspected transfusion
reaction, the transfusion service (TS) was contacted and the TS
performed a transfusion reaction
investigation according to its
policy and procedure manual,
eliminating a hemolytic transfusion reaction as the cause.
Because a bacteriogenic reaction was
suspected due to fever subsequent to a prolonged transfusion time (8
hrs.+), the hospital microbiology laboratory performed gram
stains and cultures of both PRBC contents, as well as
recipient blood cultures. All were negative.
Educational
Subsequent analysis revealed that the nurse in question required remedial training related to resolving slow running
transfusions and critical thinking in general, and also required
re-training for how to monitor and document transfusions.
A more systemic problem was identified regarding the
responsibilities and related skills of health professionals
to provide checks for patient safety as part of the
healthcare team. In-service interdisciplinary educational sessions were
held to discuss and resolve the issues. |
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QUESTIONS
TO BE CONSIDERED
To test your knowledge and as an advance
organizer for the discussion section, read and consider these questions:
-
What types of transfusion reactions
are possible in this scenario of fever following transfusion?
- Can a transfusion be given over more
than 4 hours if a physician orders it?
- What can you do if a physician's
order contradicts a policy or procedure?
- What could the nurse have done
after she saw that the port-o-cath was not running properly?
- What patient consequences could
happen if nurses do not properly chart a transfusion and
take vital signs for the entire transfusion and a blood component culture is found to be positive?
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DISCUSSION
Proceed to Discussion
(includes interactive questions with feedback):
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SUMMARY
This case study presents a
scenario in which a nurse did not follow several key transfusion
protocols and procedures, including adhering to the time limit for transfusing
blood, monitoring vital signs throughout a transfusion, and questioning orders
that contradicted hospital policies and procedures.
Based on laboratory
results and a multidisciplinary
discussion, staff concluded that a febrile non-hemolytic reaction had likely occurred
after the second PRBC and had triggered subsequent events:
- Increased temperature
and chills increased intracranial pressure (the drain had been closed the
previous day), leading to
- Seizure and
convulsions (treated by medication, induced coma, and intubation)
Further analysis resulted in individual
re-training and a system-wide education program on
responsibilities and skills for providing
interdisciplinary checks to ensure patient safety.
Key learning points include:
- Clinical staff who administer
transfusions must
be trained and assessed in blood administration.
- Monitoring and documenting vital signs must be
done for each blood component transfused before, during, and after
transfusion according to established policies and procedures.
- Scopes of practice ensure that health professionals have the required
education, training, and professional qualifications to perform their duties
competently and safely.
- Within their respective scopes of practice, members of the health care
team collaborate in providing patient care.
- Perceived loss of autonomy is considered
to be a major
obstacle to collaboration and open questioning within health teams.
- Nurses and allied health care professionals such as
medical laboratory technologists have a duty to question physician orders
that are inappropriate or unclear.
FURTHER
READING
Literature
Brunskill S, Doree C, A. Blest A,
J. Murdock J, M. Roberts M, and D. Watson D.
Bedside practice of blood transfusion - Where is the evidence?
(poster P17) Transfus Med October 2006 Oct;16(s1):32.
Carroll JS, Quijada MA.
Redirecting
traditional professional values to support safety: changing organisational
culture in health care. Qual Saf Health Care 2004 Dec;13 Suppl 2:ii16–21.
Davies C.
Getting doctors and nurses to work together BMJ 2000 Apr
15;320:1021–2.
Hillyer CD, Josephson CD, Blajchman MA, Vostal JG, Epstein JS, Goodman JL.
Bacterial contamination of blood components: risks, strategies, and
regulation: joint ASH and AABB educational session in transfusion medicine.
Hematology Am Soc Hematol Educ Program. 2003;575–89.
Kleinman S, Chan P, Robillard P.
Risks associated with transfusion of cellular blood components in Canada.
Transfus Med Rev. 2003 Apr;17(2):120–62.
Mancini ME.
Performance improvement in transfusion medicine. What do nurses need
and want? Arch Pathol Lab Med 1999;123(6):496–502.
Moore SB, Mary L. Foss ML.
Error management: theory and application in transfusion medicine at
a tertiary-care institution. Arch Pathol Lab Med
2003;127(11):1517–22.
Salvage J, Smith R.
Doctors and nurses: doing it differently. The time is ripe for a major
reconstruction. BMJ. 2000 April 15; 320(7241): 1019–20.
Shulman IA, Saxena S, Ramer
L.
Assessing blood administering practices. Arch Pathol Lab Med
1999;123(7):595–8.
Silva MA, Gregory KR, Carr-Greer MA, Holmberg JA, Kuehnert MJ, Brecher
ME; Task Force.
Summary of the AABB Interorganizational Task Force on Bacterial
Contamination of Platelets: Fall 2004 impact survey.Transfusion. 2006
Apr;46(4):636–41.
Williams PM.
Techniques for root cause analysis. Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent). 2001
April; 14(2): 154–7.
Online resources (also see individual
discussion sections)
Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality.
One dose, 50 pills
(Morbidity and Mortality Rounds on the Web)
Altogether for Health
(editorial, Student BMJ, Jan. 2006)
Australia:
BCSH.
The administration of blood and blood components and the management
of transfused patients
(1999)
Bloody Easy Online Courses
(Sunnybrook & Women's College HSC, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada) Calgary Laboratory Services.
Policies relating to transfusion of blood components and products
Case 108 - Transfusion
reaction (University of Pittsburgh) CBBS
e-Network Forum
Canadian Blood Services:
Collaborative care receives stamp of approval in CMA, CNA study involving HIV/AIDS
(CMAJ 1996;154: 21–7)
Collaborative
care means collaborative training (Health
Council of Canada)
Disruptive
Clinician Behavior: A Persistent Threat to Patient Safety (July
/August 2006, Patient Safety & Quality Healthcare)
Interprofessional
collaboration (CNA position statement)
Creating
a culture for interdisciplinary collaborative professional practice
INTD 410
(University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada)
Malpractice.
In:
Gale Encyclopedia of Nursing and Allied Health
Perlow D, Perlow M.
Courts' perceptions of the responsibilities of nursing practice
Public Health Agency of Canada.
User's Manual.
Canadian Transfusion Adverse Event Reporting Form
(April 2004) |
More...
Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada
(RCPSC):
Skills for the New Millennium: Report of the Societal Needs Working
Group
Scope of practice:
UK:
2004 SHOT
Report
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